Mareșalul Ion Antonescu

Nu mi se pare corect ca tu sa umpli acest thread cu anumite informatii, pe care tu le consideri veridice si imediat dupa aceea sa ceri inchiderea lui. Accepta niste discutii democratice pentru ca nu te-ai intalnit cu Dumnezeu si numai tu stii si esti detinatorul adevarului pe unde postezi.
Cererea ta este exagerata si nedemocratica, asa ca te rog sa nu mai ceri asa ceva si cu niste argumente care pot la fel de bine sa-ti fie aplicate si tie.

Cum vrei sa fie o discutie democratica cand parerile pro si contra nu sunt permise? Ci numai cele care-i convin cuiva. Intrebarea threadului era: Ion Antonescu- criminal sau erou?!?

Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós

Hungarian admiral and statesman who served as regent from 1920 to 1944.

Horthy Horthy was born in Kenderes in 1868, and educated at the Naval Academy of Fiume. During World War I (1914-1918) he became admiral of the Austro-Hungarian navy. After the war he returned to Hungary and organized a counterrevolution against the communist government of Béla Kun. Horthy was made commander in chief of the Hungarian armed forces in 1919, and in 1920 the National Assembly elected him regent. As regent he defeated the attempts (in March and October 1921) of Charles I, former emperor of Austria and king of Hungary, to regain the throne, a move in which Horthy was supported by the Hungarian government. Under his regime, Hungary became the first post-World War I nationalist dictatorship in Europe, ruthlessly suppressing all political opposition. During the 1930s, Horthy's government, supported by a strong tide of nationalism, wanted the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary's settlement with the Allies in 1920, to be revised to return parts of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. After the Munich Pact of 1938, Hungary appealed unsuccessfully to the Western countries to help it reclaim sections of Slovakia that were awarded to Czechoslovakia in the Treaty of Trianon. Failing there, Horthy sought help from the Germans. Delegates from Germany and Italy agreed to arbitrate the Hungarian demands. The first Vienna Award in 1938 gave Hungary a section of Slovakia with a large Hungarian population. The second Vienna Award in 1940 gave Hungary a large section of Romania. In return for the Romanian territory, Hungary agreed to fight with Germany and Italy in World War II In 1942, believing that the Axis powers would lose the war, Horthy began negotiating a separate peace treaty with the Allies. However, the Germans occupied Hungary in 1944, and Horthy chose to install a collaborating, pro-German government rather than face German takeover. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics invaded Hungary in October 1944, Horthy tried to surrender to them. The Germans discovered this and arrested him. At the end of the war, Horthy was captured by the United States Army in Bavaria and was held in protective custody until the end of 1945, when he was released. He spent the rest of his life in Portugal.

Miklos Horthy de Nagybanya (1868-1957) was born into a family of landed gentry. Having entered the Austro-Hungarian navy he served as an aide-de-camp to the Emperor, Franz Josef, prior to the First World War.

With war declared Horthy was made captain of the cruiser Novara towards the close of 1914, in which he established a name as a bold, aggressive commander in numerous surface actions.

Having (probably) planned the raid that resulted in the Otranto Straits action of May 1917, Horthy emerged with renewed fame and credit. So much so that following the mutiny at Cattaro in March 1918, followed by the forced resignation of Admiral Njegovan, Horthy found himself promoted Rear Admiral and appointed Commander in Chief (Austria-Hungary's last) of the battlefleet over the heads of many more qualified officers.

Notwithstanding this rapid promotion Horthy distinguished himself in his new role by re-energising the by then war weary fleet. Having gained the trust and moreover improved the morale of the fleet, Horthy took care to maintain the stability of the fleet as a deterrent force. At the same time, so as to keep his forces in trim, he reacted to occasional Italian light raids.

The only large-scale offensive operation undertaken by Horthy at this time occurred in June 1918, and was directed against the Otranto Barrage. However this was quickly abandoned following the loss of the dreadnought Szent Istvan.

Fortunately this setback did not affect the loyalty of the fleet until orders came from the Emperor, Karl I, on 31 October requiring him to hand over the fleet to the Yugoslav National Council.

With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire Horthy returned to Hungary, where he successfully led an uprising against the Communist government of Bela Kun. His forces entered Budapest in November 1919; Horthy established himself as regent the following March, a position he held until the Nazi occupation of 19 March 1944.

Staying on nevertheless as a figurehead, in August 1944 Horthy removed the puppet Nazi government, appointing in its place a government tasked with achieving an armistice. With such an armistice signed in Moscow, Horthy's attempt to enforce it on 15 October met with determined (and successful) German resistance.

Having been arrested by the Gestapo, Horthy and his family were removed to Germany. He served as a witness at the Nuremberg trials following the war, but was unable to return to Hungary given its Soviet occupation and new Communist government.

Thereafter in exile in Estoril, Portugal, Horthy died in 1957. With the departure of the last Soviet soldier from Hungary in 1993, Horthy was reburied in the town of his birth, Kenderes.

Horthy de Nagybanya, Nicholas


HORTHY DE NAGYBANYA, NICHOLAS [Horthy de Nagybanya, Nicholas] , Hung. Nagybányai Horthy Miklós, 1868-1957, Hungarian admiral and regent. He commanded the Austro-Hungarian fleet in World War I. After Béla Kun seized (1919) power in Hungary, the counterrevolutionary government put Horthy in command of its forces. When the Romanian forces that had defeated Kun evacuated Budapest (Nov., 1919), Horthy entered it and in 1920 was made regent and head of the state. He checked two attempts (March and Oct., 1921) of former Emperor Charles I to regain his throne in Hungary—once by persuasion and once by armed force. Charles was then formally barred from the throne and exiled, and Horthy found himself regent of a kingless kingdom. A nationalist who was distinctly inclined toward the right, he guided Hungary through the years between the two world wars. After the suicide (1941) of the premier, Paul Teleki , Hungary entered World War II as an ally of Germany. Despite Horthy's opposition, German troops occupied Hungary in Mar., 1944. When Russian troops entered Hungary, Horthy sent an armistice commission to Moscow and announced (Oct., 1944) the surrender of Hungary. The Germans immediately forced Horthy to countermand his order and resign. He was taken to Bavaria and later was freed by U.S. troops. After appearing as a witness at the Nuremberg war-crimes trial (1946), he settled (1949) in Portugal, where he died. His memoirs appeared in English in 1956.

Admiral and Regent Miklós Horthy

Some Thoughts on a Controversial Statesman

[...]

But now, by 1920, all this was history: there were no more significant national minorities, and there had come into being a competitive non-Jewish middle class. It had also become clear that at least some Jews were not satisfied with making money but wanted political power as well. The Jewish Bolsheviks who seized power in 1919 and governed the country for 133 days never admitted their Jewishness in public and were completely uninterested in Jewish issues. Still, in a small country, everybody knew who was and who was not a Jew. The result was a greatly heightened anti-Semitism, in which it was im-material that the vast majority of the Hungarian Jews had wished to have nothing to do with the Bolshevik regime. The anti-Semitism of the counter-revolutionary regime did not, however, mean any kind of anti-Jewish uniformity. Indeed, anti-Semitism ranged from the mildly economic through the political to the racist, and it is no exaggeration to say that the history of "Horthy Hungary" was marked by a political competition among anti-Semites. Even the degree of the country's alignment with Nazi Germany was largely determined, aside from the goal of territorial revisionism, by whether one aimed at a moderate or a radical solution of the Jewish question. As in so many other cases, Horthy occupied a middle position regarding the Jews, or better to say, his position swung from the middle to a moderate or a radical stance, depending on the times and on the persuasive power of those around him.

In 1921, when King Charles twice attempted to reclaim his throne, Horthy behaved most ambiguously: he assured the King of his absolute loyalty yet forced Charles into exile by claiming the threat of Entente and Little Entente military intervention. No doubt there was such a threat, but there is no proof that an invasion of Hungary would have truly ensued if Horthy had given up his post in favour of Charles. In any case, the Czechoslovak and other neighbouring governments showed themselves most shortsighted in protesting the return of the Habsburgs; it is inconceivable that King Charles (or his son Otto) would have allied himself with Hitler. Domestically, the liberal and anti-anti-Semitic Charles would have been a blessing compared with Horthy and his cronies.

[...]

The German alliance and immense domestic pressure brought a series of anti-Semitic measures. The three laws bearing on the issue that were adopted between 1938 and 1941 can be seen either as absolute abominations or as manoeuvres aimed at taking the wind out of the sails of the Germans and the domestic fascists. The truth is that while these laws visited considerable economic hardship on a number of middle-class Jews, and even led to the death of thousands in the Jewish labour formations sent to the frontline by the army, their destructive effect cannot be compared with the persecution that descended on the Jews in other parts of Europe. In March 1944, at a time when most of the over three million Polish Jews were dead, 95 per cent of the Hungarian Jews and thousands of Jewish refugees from abroad were alive, and the Jewish factory owners and bankers in Budapest derived immense profits from the manufacture of arms for the German and Hungarian armies. Whenever Hitler pushed Horthy to take drastic measures against the 800,000 Hungarian Jews, the latter replied that this would produce the collapse of the Hungarian war industry. Whenever the Hungarian government planned a little more quiet resistance to German demands, the Hungarian Jewish leaders put in their plea for more collaboration so as to save the Jewish community.

No one likes to discuss this subject to- day, but it must be said here that the immediate interest of the Jews, namely survival, was not necessarily identical with the interest of the Allies, which was to defeat Germany, or with the interest of such satellite regimes as that of Hungary, for whom some resistance to German demands might conceivably have brought better treatment after the war. It is wrong to say, as some Hungarian conservative politicians are arguing today, that Hungary collaborated with the Germans mainly so as to save Jewish lives, but it is also wrong to say, as the allies did during the war or as left-wing critics of the Horthy regime have been asserting ever since, that Hungary should have resisted the Germans outright. How was such a resistance to be achieved when arms for resisting the Germans could only have been had from Germany; when most of the army officers were Nazi sympathizers; and when the population generally expected its economic betterment to come from Germany? It is easy to counter, of course, that the army should have been purged and the populace re-educated, but such a statement ignores the consequences of the Peace Treaty at Trianon, the nature of Hungarian interwar politics, and the hostility of Hungary's fascist neighbours. Moreover, Horthy was correct in saying that in the case of military resistance the Jewish community would have been annihilated - as it was in Poland or in the Netherlands. Horthy was also correct in arguing in his memoirs that, in the long run, nothing made any difference, for the Poles, who had consistently resisted the Germans, were badly punished after the war, whereas the Czechs who generally did not resist, were rewarded in many ways by the Allies. Ultimately, all these countries, including Hungary, fell to the Communists. And while it is true that anti-Semitic legislation in Hungary prepared the way for the wholesale robbery of Jewish property in 1944 as well as for the deportation, by brutal Hungarian gendarmes, of half a million Jews before the eyes of an indifferent public, it is also true that in such countries as for instance France, where there had been no anti-Semitic laws before the German occupation, thousands of Jews were also deported, by brutal French gendarmes, before the eyes of an indifferent public. Meanwhile, in fascist Italy, where Mussolini had introduced some anti-Semitic measures as early as 1938, the public rather successfully resisted the efforts of the German occupiers and their Italian henchmen to deport the Jews to Auschwitz.

[...]

The Horthy regime had failed: it did not protect the country against German and Soviet imperialism; it was unable to preserve its territorial reacquisitions (in fact, Hungary lost some additional territory after the Second World War); it gave up half a million of its most industrious citizens to the German murder factory; it did not save the country from devastation and ruin; it did not even succeed in protecting the privileged social classes in whose interests the counter-revolution had been made. It is unlikely, however, that any other regime would have done better; some others in Hitler's Europe did definitely worse. It should be understood that the material and human losses suffered by states during the war, and their postwar treatment, depended on luck, geography, and great power politics. At no time was their postwar fate a function of wartime merits and demerits; witness the relative luck of National Socialist Austria, collaborationist France, and fascist Slovakia, but also the catastrophic experiences of anti-Nazi Poland.

Miklós Horthy himself was neither better nor worse than most other military men who emerged as political leaders in the interwar years. He was neither a fascist nor a liberal; he was not a monster, but he was not a humanitarian either. He was no democrat but never tried to be a dictator. He claimed to have been a lifelong anti-Semite; still, under his reign and despite the deportations, more Jews survived the Nazi terror than in any other country within Hitler's Europe. He was no more unintelligent than Marshal Pétain or Generalissimo Franco, and he was certainly less cruel than General Antonescu of Romania. Like so many other statesmen of the period, Miklós Horthy deserved both to be rewarded and to be punished severely after the war. He might even merit a little sympathy, but he does not deserve admiration.

Intr-adevar Horthy ( vitez Nagybanyai Horthy Miklos, adica Miklós Horthy de Nagybanyai, de origine Svab nascut langa Nagybanya- Baia Mare)  e contestat de foarte multi, dar a avut o serie de rezultate pozitive. A reusit sa stabilizeze Ungaria Mica dupa un razboi pierdut si a format o democratie destul de stabila. Are, ca orice sistem politic, si o serie de aspecte negative.

In acelasi context, tot in sensul acelorasi interese obscure, pe Pacepa il reabiliteaza desi a fost un mare tradator al acelui moment in care a activat ca sef al serviciilor secrete. Depusese un juramant pentru patrie si la incalcat grosolan, s-a sters cu el pe undeva. Cine stie cate gramezi de $$$$ i-a intunecat sentimentele de roman?

Acuma vezi tu rakoczy de ce exista multi care'l iubesc pe Antonescu ? Tot din acelasi motiv pentru care unii il iubesc pe Horty. Sau din acelasi motiv pentru care altii il iubesc pe Hitler.

Asa zic multi in România cum zici tu de Horty: Antonescu e contestat de foarte multi, dar a avut o serie de rezultate pozitive.

Dupa mine cu totii au facut pactul cu diavolul, au consimtit si au pus umarul la politica criminala a lui Hitler, si'mi pare bine ca putrezesc cu totii in iad acesti dementi, impreuna cu toti aliati lor nenorociti.

PS: Cand ai preluat citatul din raportul comisiei internationale pentru studierea holocaustului din Romania ti'a scapat pasajul despre Ungaria. A fost o scapare sau a fost intentionat ? Pentru ca vezi tu, rackocy, eu cunosc raportul asta pe de rost si l'am citat de mai multe ori chiar pe acest forum, cu privire la crimele lui Antonescu, si niciodata nu am facut referire la genocidul evreilor si cetatenilor roma din Ungaria. Poate te gandesti si de ce.

S'auzim de bine.

Se spune aici ca Romania nu avea de ales. Ba avea de ales. Polonezii au ales sa nu accepte planurile naziste. Romania, Ungaria, Spania, Italia au ales sa colaboreze

Pacepa nu este decat un defector. Americanii si nici romanii nu au prea multa stima pentru acesti oameni, stai linistit. Reabilitare sa se impunea pentru ca Pacepa n'a fost un criminal?, nu a nenorocit vietile oamenilor?. In acelasi timp, prea multa stima pentru el n'are nimeni. Spre exemplu ar fi putut s'o incaseze foarte bine si de la romani si de la americani. Nu cred ca s'ar fi plans nimeni din cauza asta.

Ce putea alege polonia, sa se alieze cu o tara , Germania, cu care avea de impartit teritorii? Adica Polonia se alia contra poloniei.
  Iar cand vorbim de celelalte tari, care au acceptat planurile lui Hitler, ar fi mai bine sa specifici si motivele pentru care au acceptat si daca motivele unora ar fi o scuza.
  Romania avea promisiuni sa reia teritoriile ocupate de rusi, ar fi un motiv.Nu cunosc motivele spaniei. Italia insa, opta pentru coloni din nordul africi, Libia si cat timp nu e vorba de acaparare de coloni in tarile vecine si mai cu seama in Europa si ei pot fi scuzati.Dar unguri care alesesera de mult sa aibe colonie in tarile invecinate, nu se mai pot scuza.Sa nu credeti ca tarile europene nu vad in extinderea suprafetei si populatiei ungare, un pericol in viitor pentru pacea europeana !

Sa recapitulam:
- Romania, Italia, Ungaria (si Spania cu anumite rezerve) au ales sa colaboreze in ideea ca vor beneficia de pe urma milosteniei lui Hitler, stiind ca n'au nici o sansa in fata Germaniei
- Polonia la fel si alte tari au preferat sa fie pur si simplu sfartecate de catre nazisti stiind ca n'au nici o sansa in fata germaniei naziste

Iata deci cum toata Europa stia ca n'are nici o sansa in fata Germaniei naziste, numai ca unii n'au colaborat chiar daca stiau ca or sa moara iar tara lor va fi pierduta.

Romani n'au iesit sa'i intampine pe nemti cu tunurile si tancurile pe care chiar le aveau, in schimb polonezii au atacat tancurile germane cu cavaleria.

Deciziile lui Antonescu ne costa foarte scump, azi. O fi fost un bun comandant militar, insa ca si conducator de stat a fost un dezastru pentru viitorul Romaniei si Basarabiei.

Sa recapitulam:
- Romania, Italia, Ungaria (si Spania cu anumite rezerve) au ales sa colaboreze in ideea ca vor beneficia de pe urma milosteniei lui Hitler, stiind ca n'au nici o sansa in fata Germaniei
- Polonia la fel si alte tari au preferat sa fie pur si simplu sfartecate de catre nazisti stiind ca n'au nici o sansa in fata germaniei naziste

Iata deci cum toata Europa stia ca n'are nici o sansa in fata Germaniei naziste, numai ca unii n'au colaborat chiar daca stiau ca or sa moara iar tara lor va fi pierduta.

Romani n'au iesit sa'i intampine pe nemti cu tunurile si tancurile pe care chiar le aveau, in schimb polonezii au atacat tancurile germane cu cavaleria.

Deciziile lui Antonescu ne costa foarte scump, azi. O fi fost un bun comandant militar, insa ca si conducator de stat a fost un dezastru pentru viitorul Romaniei si Basarabiei.

cand spui ca armata romana ar fi avut o sansa in fata armatei germane banuiesc ca glumesti.

Nu data, nu glumesc. Gestul polonezilor a fost o declaratie de razboi simbolica impotriva Germaniei
Declaratie pe care noi n'am facut'o. Noi am preferat ce preferam si azi: politica jumatatilor de masura, balcanismul, curvărăsia politică.

România n'ar fi avut vreo sansa militara. Ar fi avut insa alte sanse:
- sansa ca romanii sa nu mai fie considerati de multi dintre basarabeni drept fastcisti
- sansa ca basarabenii sa nu mai considere armata sovietica ca pe o armata eliberatoare
- sansa de a fi o tara de oameni "drepti intre popoare"
- sansa de a avea o Românie unita in spirit si poate si in hotare

Poate cea mai importanta sansa pe care ar fi avut'o Romania a fost aceea de a nu fi pe viitor o tara comunista.

cand spui ca armata romana ar fi avut o sansa in fata armatei germane banuiesc ca glumesti.

Gestul polonezilor a fost o declaratie de razboi simbolica impotriva Germaniei

Cat despre cei doi oameni de stat, Nicolae Horthy si Ion Antonescu, au facut ceea ce puteau face la vremurile respective. Asta este.

Nu data, nu glumesc. Gestul polonezilor a fost o declaratie de razboi simbolica impotriva Germaniei
Declaratie pe care noi n'am facut'o. Noi am preferat ce preferam si azi: politica jumatatilor de masura, balcanismul, curvărăsia politică.

România n'ar fi avut vreo sansa militara. Ar fi avut insa alte sanse:
- sansa ca romanii sa nu mai fie considerati de multi dintre basarabeni drept fastcisti
- sansa ca basarabenii sa nu mai considere armata sovietica ca pe o armata eliberatoare
- sansa de a fi o tara de oameni "drepti intre popoare"
- sansa de a avea o Românie unita in spirit si poate si in hotare

Poate cea mai importanta sansa pe care ar fi avut'o Romania a fost aceea de a nu fi pe viitor o tara comunista.

gresit;

impartirea europei nu a avut nici o legatura cu atitudinea din timpul razboiului;

tari ca Italia, Spania, Franta desi au luptat de partea axei au beneficiat de ajutorul americanilor

tari ca Polonia, Grecia desi au luptat de partea Aliantei au fost "acordate" cu marinimie rusilor;

ce au castigat polonezii din parte americanilor pentru ca s-au supus distrugerii din partea germanilor? americanii, francezii si englezii s-au uitat cu bratele incrucisate cum cavaleria poloneza a fost macelarita de tancurile si aviatia germana.

au miscat un deget sa ii ajute?

Mai putin cunoscut este ce anume a premers ajungerea la putere a lui Ion Antonescu, situatia in care se gasea Romania in vara lui 1940.
Fara sa vreau sa "inflamez" spiritele voi aduce in atentie un aspect mai putin cunoscut.
In privinta faptului ca la Trianon frontiera de Vest a Ro a fost trasata aiurea, asta se stie, banuiesc. In anii 30 au existat diverse incercari si propuneri de tratative ce urmau sa duca la o solutie amiabila in privinta zonei Arad-Salonta-Oradea-Satmar, cu populatie presominant maghiara... Discutiile au inceput. Au fost si tratativele de la Turmu-Severin, in august 1940, dar alea au fost ultimile dintr-un sir lung de discutii. Pe parcursul anilor 1938-1939 partea romana a tot amanat, tergiversat.

Dar, la 26 iunie 1940, la trei zile după ce Franța, înfrantă, a fost silită să semneze armistițiul, guvernul sovietic a emis un ultimatum: el cerea României să renunțe la Basarabia și Bucovina de Nord ( total 68% populatie romaneasca) într-un interval de câteva zile.
Atunci, diplomatia germana si cea maghiara au cerut Romaniei sa reziste in Basarabia, cu orice risc, urmand ca sa primeasca ajutor de la armata Ungariei.... In virtutea acordurilor semnate intre Germania si Ungaria, Reichul urma sa intervina mai apoi impotriva Rusiei ...
Ungaria a dat asigurari ferme si garantate de nemti ca NU va ataca România "pe la spate" in Transilvania, ci dimpotriva o va ajuta, - asa cum am spus.
In ciuda tuturor protestelor politicienilor de marca ai României, Regele Carol II a hotarat cedarea...Autoritatile Romane s-au retras fara sa traga un foc de arma...

La 19-21 august 1940 - Tratative româno-bulgare, desfășurate sub arbitraj german, Romania cedeaza Cadrilaterul ( Dobrogea de Sud, populatie predominant turca si bulgara)....fara nici o opozitie...
La 30 August 1940 a urmat Arbitrajul de la Viena in favoarea Ungariei, arbitraj semnat si acceptat de partea romana prin care Transilvania de N ( 43.591 km2) se realipea la Ungaria.

Recensământul din 1941 (unguresc)
      Maghiară.... 1 125 732
      Româna........ 926 268
      Germană........ 90 195
      Rutenă............ 16 281
      Slovacă........... 12 807
       etc.
Autoritatile Romane s-au retras fara sa traga un foc de arma...
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Ne putem pune intrebarea legitima: Ce s-ar fi intamplat daca Romania nu ceda in permanenta? Daca intra in razboi contra Rusiei, constituind pretextul ca Germania sa se alature mai devreme in razboiul in Est?
Intrebari ce vor fi fara raspuns...
Ramane insa exemplul Poloniei...